Updated November 11, 2026. A general explanation, not legal advice.
The fiduciary duty of investment advisers
Under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, every investment adviser is a fiduciary to its clients, and owes each of them a duty of care and a duty of loyalty. Together they require the adviser to act in the client's best interest at all times and never to place its own interests ahead of the client's. The duty applies to SEC-registered advisers, state-registered advisers and advisers exempt from registration, and a client cannot waive it (Release IA-5248).
| Duty | What it requires | Main parts in Release IA-5248 |
|---|---|---|
| Duty of care | Advice that is in the client's best interest, based on a reasonable understanding of the client's objectives | Advice in the client's best interest; seeking best execution where the adviser selects the broker-dealers; advice and monitoring over the course of the relationship |
| Duty of loyalty | Not subordinating the client's interests to the adviser's own | Full and fair disclosure of all material facts about the relationship; eliminating conflicts of interest, or disclosing them so the client can give informed consent |
The duty is not written out in a rule. It comes from Section 206 of the Advisers Act as the Supreme Court read it in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau (1963). The Commission set out its own reading in one place in the Commission Interpretation Regarding Standard of Conduct for Investment Advisers, Release IA-5248, issued on 5 June 2019 and published at 84 FR 33669 on 12 July 2019. That release is the reference examiners work from, and this guide follows its structure.
Who owes a fiduciary duty?
Because the duty arises under Section 206, which reaches every adviser, the release says the interpretation applies to SEC-registered advisers, state-registered advisers, and advisers that are exempt from or prohibited from SEC registration. Section 206 is not limited to securities transactions: it covers the whole relationship.
The release does not take a position on any fiduciary duty that applies under state law. ERISA and other statutes can add duties of their own for particular clients.
Can the fiduciary duty be waived or limited by contract?
The fiduciary duty applies to the entire relationship, and its specific obligations depend on what the adviser agreed to do. An adviser running a discretionary portfolio for a retail client owes far more than one hired to manage a fixed income sleeve within tight guidelines. The adviser and client may shape the scope of the relationship by agreement, provided there is full and fair disclosure and informed consent.
What they cannot do is waive the duty itself. The release gives three examples of provisions that would be inconsistent with the Advisers Act, whatever the client's sophistication:
- a statement that the adviser will not act as a fiduciary
- a blanket waiver of all conflicts of interest
- a waiver of any specific obligation under the Advisers Act
Hedge clauses. The release withdrew the 2007 Heitman staff no-action letter and said there are few, if any, circumstances in which a hedge clause in a retail client agreement would be consistent with the antifraud provisions, where it purports to relieve the adviser of liability for conduct as to which the client has a non-waivable cause of action. For institutional clients it depends on the facts.
What does the duty of care require?
The release describes three parts.
1. Advice in the client's best interest
The adviser must have a reasonable understanding of the client's objectives and a reasonable belief that its advice is in the client's best interest based on them.
- For retail clients, that means at a minimum a reasonable inquiry into the client's financial situation, financial sophistication, investment experience and financial goals, which the release calls the "investment profile." A comprehensive financial plan generally needs more: income, investments, assets and debts, marital status, tax status, insurance and goals.
- Updating. In an ongoing relationship the adviser generally needs to update the profile and adjust its advice when circumstances change. The frequency depends on the facts. The release gives retirement, a change in marital status and a change in tax law as examples that could require a new inquiry.
- For institutional clients, the inquiry is shaped by the mandate. A bond manager needs to understand the client's objectives for the bond portfolio, not its entire balance sheet.
- Reasonable investigation. The adviser must investigate an investment enough not to base advice on materially inaccurate or incomplete information.
- Cost matters but is not the test. Cost is one of many factors. The duty does not require recommending the lowest cost option, and recommending the cheapest option without further analysis does not satisfy it either.
- Riskier products need more scrutiny. For retail clients the release calls for heightened scrutiny of high-risk products such as penny stocks, and says leveraged and inverse exchange-traded products may not be in a retail client's best interest absent a short-term, client-specific objective, and would need daily monitoring if they are.
- Account type and rollovers. The duty covers advice about which type of account to use and whether to roll assets over, for example from a retirement plan into an account the adviser manages.
2. Best execution
Where the adviser selects the broker-dealers that execute client trades, it must seek the most favorable total cost or proceeds for the client under the circumstances. The release quotes the Commission's long-standing position that the determinative factor is not the lowest commission but "the best qualitative execution," taking into account the full range and quality of a broker's services, and that advisers should "periodically and systematically" evaluate the execution clients receive. The best execution guide covers the review, soft dollars and the Form ADV disclosure.
3. Advice and monitoring over the relationship
The adviser must provide advice and monitoring at a frequency in the client's best interest, given the scope of the relationship. An ongoing relationship paid by a periodic asset-based fee carries a relatively extensive duty to monitor. A one-time financial plan for a one-time fee generally does not, absent an agreement. Where the adviser has an ongoing relationship, monitoring includes whether the client's account or program type, such as a wrap account, continues to be in its best interest.
What does the duty of loyalty require?
The duty of loyalty requires that the adviser not subordinate its clients' interests to its own. In practice it has three parts.
Full and fair disclosure of all material facts about the relationship, including the capacity in which the firm is acting. This matters most for dual registrants, who should explain when they act as broker and when as adviser.
Eliminate or expose conflicts. The adviser must eliminate, or at least expose through full and fair disclosure, all conflicts of interest that might incline it, "consciously or unconsciously," to give advice that is not disinterested. The release is specific about what full and fair means:
- Disclosure must be specific enough that the client can understand the conflict and decide whether to consent.
- Saying the adviser has "other clients" or "conflicts" without describing them is inadequate.
- Saying the adviser "may" have a conflict is inadequate when the conflict actually exists. "May" is appropriate only for a conflict that does not exist now but might reasonably arise.
- The level of detail can differ between retail and institutional clients, but in every case it must be enough for an informed decision.
Informed consent. Consent can be explicit or, depending on the facts, implicit, for example by entering into or continuing the relationship after receiving Form ADV. The adviser does not have to confirm that each client understood. But it may not infer consent where it knew, or reasonably should have known, that the client did not understand the conflict. Where a conflict cannot be disclosed clearly enough for a client to consent, the adviser should eliminate it or mitigate it until it can.
Disclosure is not the whole duty. The release is explicit that full and fair disclosure and informed consent stop a conflict from itself being a breach, but do not by themselves satisfy the duty to act in the client's best interest. A disclosed conflict still cannot be used to give advice that is not in the client's interest.
Allocation. When allocating investment opportunities, an adviser need not use pro rata allocation or any particular method, but it must disclose its allocation practices fully and fairly, and they must not prevent it from giving advice in each client's best interest.
How is the duty enforced?
The duty is enforceable through Section 206. The release notes that claims under Section 206(1) require scienter, while claims under Section 206(2) can rest on simple negligence, citing Robare Group v. SEC (D.C. Cir. 2019). An adviser can breach its fiduciary duty without intending to mislead anyone.
Where the duty shows up in the rules
- Form ADV Part 2A, the brochure, sets minimum disclosures, including conflicts, and is delivered under Rule 204-3 before or at the time of the advisory contract.
- Form CRS, adopted in the same June 2019 package (Release IA-5247), summarizes conflicts for retail investors in plain English.
- Rule 204A-1 requires the code of ethics to set a standard of business conduct that reflects the firm's fiduciary obligations (Rule 204A-1(a)(1)). See the code of ethics guide.
- Rule 206(4)-7 requires written policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent a breach of the Act and its rules. The release suggests advisers consider whether policies on monitoring would be appropriate under it.
The Division of Examinations put adherence to fiduciary standards of conduct, meaning the duty of care and the duty of loyalty, first among its adviser topics in its fiscal year 2026 priorities, and its fiscal year 2027 priorities again open the adviser section with fiduciary standards of conduct.
What do examiners look for?
Each part of the interpretation becomes a question an examiner can put to the file:
- Are conflicts the firm actually has, such as revenue sharing or affiliated products, disclosed as facts rather than as things that "may" happen?
- Does the brochure describe the business as it is now? Conflicts disclosed in a brochure nobody updated when the conflict changed are a recurring problem.
- Is there a record of the analysis behind rollover and account type recommendations?
- Were client profiles updated in long relationships, or after events such as retirement?
- Where the firm chooses brokers, is there a periodic review of execution quality?
- Do advisory agreements contain hedge clauses or broad waivers?
- Were principal trades disclosed and consented to before completion, as Section 206(3) requires, rather than papered afterwards?
Common questions
Are all investment advisers fiduciaries?
Yes. The fiduciary duty arises under Section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, which applies to every adviser. The Commission's 2019 interpretation (Release IA-5248) states that it applies to SEC-registered and state-registered advisers and to advisers that are exempt from registration or prohibited from registering.
Can a client waive an adviser's fiduciary duty?
No. Under Release IA-5248 the scope of the relationship can be shaped by agreement with full and fair disclosure and informed consent, but the duty itself cannot be waived. A statement that the adviser will not act as a fiduciary, a blanket waiver of all conflicts of interest, or a waiver of a specific Advisers Act obligation is inconsistent with the Act regardless of the client's sophistication.
Is disclosing a conflict enough to satisfy fiduciary duty?
Not on its own. Release IA-5248 says that full and fair disclosure with informed consent prevents the conflict itself from being a breach, but does not by itself satisfy the adviser's duty to act in the client's best interest. Where a conflict cannot be disclosed clearly enough for the client to give informed consent, the adviser should eliminate it or mitigate it until it can.
Does fiduciary duty mean recommending the cheapest investment?
No. Release IA-5248 treats cost as one of many important factors, alongside an investment's objectives, characteristics, liquidity, risks and potential benefits, volatility and time horizon. A higher-cost option can be in the client's best interest if other factors outweigh cost, and recommending the lowest cost option without further analysis does not satisfy the duty.
What is the difference between the duty of care and the duty of loyalty?
The duty of care is about the quality of the advice: understanding the client, investigating investments, seeking best execution and monitoring. The duty of loyalty is about whose interests come first: disclosing material facts and conflicts and not putting the adviser's interest ahead of the client's. Both are described in Release IA-5248, and both arise under Section 206 of the Advisers Act.
Where does the fiduciary duty in the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 come from?
From Section 206 of the Act, the antifraud provision, as the Supreme Court read it in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau (1963). The Act and the Commission's rules do not define the duty. The Commission set out its interpretation in Release IA-5248, issued on 5 June 2019 and published at 84 FR 33669 on 12 July 2019.
Does an adviser have a fiduciary duty to monitor a client's account?
It depends on the scope of the relationship. Release IA-5248 says the duty of care includes advice and monitoring at a frequency that is in the client's best interest. An ongoing relationship paid by a periodic asset-based fee carries a relatively extensive duty to monitor, while an adviser giving a one-time financial plan for a one-time fee is unlikely to have one unless it has agreed to.
Turn the duty into a record
A fiduciary duty is tested by what the firm can show. Luna's compliance manual template sets out policies for conflicts, client profiles and monitoring, and the trading and best execution policy template covers broker selection and periodic execution review. Luna's ADV brochure review reads your Form ADV Part 2A topic by topic, conflicts included, and compares it with brochures from advisers of your size and business model. For the disclosure documents themselves, see the guides to Form ADV Part 2 brochures and Form CRS.
Related guides
In Luna
- ADV Brochure ReviewProduct
- RIA Compliance Manual TemplateModel policy
- Best Execution and Trading Policy Template for RIAsModel policy
The rules behind this guide
- Antifraud provisionAdvisers Act Section 206
- Compliance RuleRule 206(4)-7
- Code of Ethics RuleRule 204A-1
- Brochure RuleRule 204-3
- Form CRS Delivery RuleRule 204-5
- FY2026 examination prioritiesExamination Priorities FY2026